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‘Grand Pretentions, Faulty Execu-
tion and Puny Results’? A critical 
examination of the international 
community’s ability to turn inter-
national environmental treaties into 
environmnetally useful action
This article considers international environmen-
tal treaties and endeavours to explore and eval-
uate the extent to which treaties produce tangible 
environmental results. It addresses the faultline be-
tween the treaty instrument itself and the transition 
required to transform textual agreement into envi-
ronmentally beneficial action. The article takes a 
particular evaluative opinion from environmental 
expert Daniel Bodansky as a touchstone and pro-
ceeds to test his position by critiquing the develop-
ment of the ‘environmental treaty environmental ac-
tion’ dynamic across modern times. It is concluded 
that treaties will often fall entirely flat in practice, 
yet “this is by no means the general rule”.
Thomas L. Muinzer
This study engages with the process of turning international environ-
mental treaties into environmentally beneficial action. The investigation 
will evaluate the extent to which international environmental agreements 
have the propensity to crystallise actual environmental results.
A Point of Departure: Professor Bodansky
The quotation embedded in this article’s title is drawn from the writings 
of environmental authority Daniel Bodansky. In The Art and Craft of In-
ternational Environmental Law Bodansky (2010: 206), drawing in turn 
on Elmore (1978: 186), suggests that:
[t]ranslating international treaties on the environment into ac-
tion is notoriously difficult.  Many treaties are characterised… 
by ‘grand pretentions, faulty execution and puny results.’
This statement catches the spirit of the evaluative concerns driving the 
present critique. Note that Bodansky emphasises how ‘[m]any treaties’ 
are fundamentally flawed. Not “all treaties”, not “international environ-
mental treaties”, but ‘many treaties’. The implication is not that the in-
ternational treaty system is unworkable or that it ought somehow to be 
disposed of per se, but, rather, that many treaties are flawed, and one 
therefore infers, must consequently be flawed in specific, identifiable 
ways. This is a noteworthy point in a world where treaties are by no 
means valued across the board as an ideal international legal mechanism. 
For example, the eco-economic merit inherent in an environmental fed-
eralist approach to governance has been elaborated by B. Field and M. 
Field (2009: 357-360); in this sort of framework the onus of governance 
is placed upon small states rather than upon sweeping international ar-
rangement.
Bodansky’s comment also highlights how a treaty’s potential flaws may 
realistically range beyond the actual treaty document so as to inhere in 
an extended process: ‘grand pretentions’ suggest that the intentions lead-
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ing to a finalised treaty may exhibit a tendency to over-reach the treaty’s 
own limitations in an unrealistic manner; ‘faulty execution’ pertains to 
the next stage, that is, the stage beyond the negotiation and construction 
of the treaty, suggesting that the treaty is carried out ineffectively after 
its construction; ‘puny results’ proceeds a step further again, the impli-
cation being that the treaty’s actual environmental outcomes have fallen 
drastically below an acceptable threshold, perhaps even shamefully so: 
(‘puny’ is in effect a loaded, derogatory term).  In other words, and for all 
its brevity, Bodansky’s observation captures the spirit of a complex line-
ar process beginning with the negotiation and creation of a given treaty, 
proceeding to its (inter)national implementation, and progressing thence 
to its tangible consequences for the environment. This article is primarily 
concerned with what is perhaps the most neglected element of this chain, 
namely the end-point of the process pertaining to an international treaty’s 
environmental consequences.
Sowing the Seeds of ‘International’ Environmental Law
International environmental law exists as a body of multilateral agree-
ments among states across the world (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey 2007: 
29-43). Such agreements can take a variety of forms, and the most pre-
dominant of these is the international environmental treaty. ‘Treaties 
(also referred to as conventions, accords, agreements and protocols)’, 
Sands (2003: 126) writes, ‘are the primary source of international le-
gal rights and obligations in relation to environmental protection’.  The 
Convention to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture (CPBUA), adopted in 
1902 by 12 European nations, is normally held to be the first multilater-
al environmental treaty (Bodansky 2010: 23). This type of international 
law is not normally imbued with a level of binding legal force equivalent 
to that which underpins national law. Nonetheless, the cumulative uni-
versal attitude towards international treaty law is characterised by the 
dictum pacta sunt servanda – treaties must be obeyed – so that one starts 
from the assumption that a nation subscribes to an environmental treaty 
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because it intends to obey it.  Indeed, Sunkin, Ong and Wight (2002: 3) 
suggest that ‘the existence of a treaty relating to any particular matter 
will usually provide a clear and conclusive statement of the rights and 
duties of the States parties [sic.] to it in their relations with each other’. 
States then not only have an obligation to adhere to the treaties they sub-
scribe to but also share a wider sense of obligation predicated upon their 
responsibilities toward other international signatories.
The 1902 CPBUA and the environmental treaties that slowly began to 
emerge in its wake across the early 1900s served to characterise the 
manner by which states were moving towards the understanding that 
supra-national environmental issues could not be addressed adequate-
ly in isolation (Kiss and Shelton 2007: 32-34). This development was 
bolstered in its infancy by an important international case commonly 
described as the Trail Smelter arbitration. 
Trail Smelter centred on a major North American smelting plant located 
at Trail, Canada. The plant included two smokestacks stretching over 
400ft into the sky that emitted thousands of tons of sulphur every month 
over the course of the plant’s smelting operations. Situated approximate-
ly seven miles from the US–Canadian border, pollution from the stacks 
had been causing damage to trees, farms and properties in Washington 
State on the American side of the border. A Mixed Arbitral Tribunal con-
sisting of a US jurist, a Canadian jurist, and a non-US citizen/non-British 
subject was convened to resolve the problem, and the tribunal’s decision 
was set out in 1939: Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (1939) 33 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 182.  The tribunal ruled that Canada was legally culpable for 
the damage caused in Washington and this resolution inaugurated two 
key principles of international environmental law, summarised here by 
Bratspies and Miller (2006: 3):
the state has a duty to prevent transboundary harm… (‘one should use 
one’s own property so [as] not to injure another’); and 
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the ‘polluter pays’ principle, which holds that the polluting state should 
pay compensation for the transboundary harm it has caused.
As the seeds sown by the early international treaties and agreements be-
gan to blossom it became steadily apparent that if a profound level of 
international environmental action was to be achieved in practice then 
the construction of increasingly sophisticated international legal frame-
works would be necessary. Following the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment in 1972, commonly known as the Stockholm 
Conference, this unfolding realisation reached its first apotheosis.
First Stop, Stockholm
The Stockholm Conference was attended by 113 States, and occurred 
at a period where “environmental law” was for the first time beginning 
to burst through into the mainstream legal disciplines (Sohn 1973). In-
ternationally, 1970 was the inaugural year of First Earth Day, and at the 
domestic level in the UK it was the year in which the Department of 
the Environment was founded.  This latter UK development pointed the 
way towards the Control of Pollution Act 1974, a first key step on the 
UK’s path to enacting a sophisticated body of domestic environmental 
legislation. In the European Community (EC, now European Union) en-
vironmental law was coming similarly to the fore; 1973 heralding the 
adoption of the EC’s first Environmental Action Plan, and in early 1970s 
America similar developments manifested in the creation of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the National Environmental Policy Act, and 
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
Persevering in the face of complications evoked by economic dispari-
ty between developed and developing countries, Stockholm resulted in 
three major documents (Galizzi, 2006): a Declaration on the Human En-
vironment, known as the ‘Stockholm Declaration,’ which broke down 
the States’ common outlook on the environment into 26 key principles; 
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an Action Plan, concerning direction on environmental activities; and 
a Resolution on Financial and Institutional Arrangements (Stockholm 
Conference 1972). The Action Plan is the most practical of the docu-
ments. It incorporated 109 recommendations, adopted by all of the 
subscribing States.  These were divided into three categories which in-
cluded: Earthwatch, the global environmental assessment programme; 
environmental management activities; and international measures to 
support the national and international actions of environmental assess-
ment and management.
One important outcome of Stockholm was the founding of the United 
Nations Environment Programme, which was designed to monitor the 
progress of the international environmental movement.  A decade after 
Stockholm this body reviewed the success of the Conference and this in 
turn led to the Nairobi Declaration. This Declaration asserted the need 
for refreshed and enhanced international measures to refine, restructure, 
and build upon the foundations laid by Stockholm. The Declaration con-
cluded that:
the Action Plan has only been partially implemented, and the 
results cannot be considered as satisfactory…  [T]he Action 
Plan has not had sufficient impact[.]
(Nairobi Declaration, para.2)
An apparently insufficient practical deployment of the Action Plan 
flagged by the Nairobi Declaration suggests that the condemnatory view 
embedded in this article’s title concerning grand pretentions, faulty exe-
cution and puny results may be a potentially fair characterisation of the 
Stockholm gathering.  Stockholm appears to have proven widely inad-
equate in terms of tangible results, it being remembered, of course, that 
the Action Plan was the crucial text in terms of tangible environmental 
action, as its title suggests.
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Next Stop, Rio
The Nairobi Declaration was followed by the World Commission on En-
vironment and Development (WCED). In 1987 the WCED published 
Our Common Future, known as the “Brundtland Report”, a document 
that has had an enormous influence upon the trajectory of international 
environmental agreements. The Report articulated a firm interconnection 
between environmental protection and national development:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that 
it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.
(World Commission on Environment 1987: 3.27)
The Report was published in the wake of the discovery of the Antarc-
tic ozone hole (1985), which sparked an international concern regard-
ing global warming, and this signposted the international community 
towards its next destination, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), commonly described as the Rio Summit (Pan-
jabi 1997). Considered by some as heralding a “New Ecological Order” 
(Sand 1993: 377), the Rio Summit took place in 1992 and was attended by 
176 countries. The Bruntland Report’s momentum was carried through 
so that a consequent preoccupation with the principle of “sustainable 
development” allowed the concept of environmental protection and the 
notion of national development to become inextricably fused together on 
Rio’s international stage.  Several key agreements were produced at the 
gathering. In the present context the most significant of these is “Agenda 
21” which outlined the means of enhancing sustainable development in 
practice.
In observing that the practical strategies constructed at Stockholm had 
not produced the wide-ranging active environmental effects that had 
been intended, the Rio parties created a Commission on Sustainable De-
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velopment to monitor the practical implementation of Agenda 21. The 
1997 Earth Summit+5 was also put in place as a means of reviewing 
matters five years on.  When the review finally occurred its findings were 
not overly encouraging in terms of a widely effective reduction in dis-
cernible international environmental damage; and Agenda 21, taken in a 
broad sense, was not a tremendous practical success (Speth 2004: 790). 
As, however, environmental scholar R.K. Turner (1993: 383) empha-
sised immediately after Rio had been signed, ‘[w]e do not yet have a 
blueprint for sustainability’. Agenda 21 might have yielded imperfect 
results, but the fact that Rio put in place a review process to detect and 
attempt to recalibrate matters some years on provides a valuable counter-
balance that surely invites resistance to the view that Rio was thoroughly 
faulty and puny in its achievements.
To Comply or Not to Comply, That is the Question
The international environmental treaty system is a complex “umbrella” 
structure that overarches the signatory nations beneath it and, as Mbuna 
(in Suskind, Dolin and Breslin, 1992: 163) stresses, it is generally the 
case that ‘few resources are provided at the secretariat level to do more 
than monitor adherence in a minimal way’. In the 1960s the Internation-
al Whaling Commission (IWC) set a ban on the hunting of humpback 
whales due to a dangerous decline in their numbers. The Soviet Un-
ion had subscribed to the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling in 1946 and under the terms of the treaty was obligated to 
abide by the ruling. After the dissembling of the Soviet Union, national 
records were revealed exposing how Soviet whalers had continued to 
kill the animals, pressing on, indeed, to exceed the regular slaughter lev-
els by vast amounts. The treaty violation and intensified slaughter had 
been undertaken surreptitiously. The Secretary of the IWC declared that 
‘thousands of whales we thought were protected have been systemati-
cally slaughtered. The enormity of the deception is staggering’. (Walsh, 
1999: 321-322). This example illustrates one country’s premeditated dis-
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regard for treaty laws that it purports to uphold. Further, it exposes how 
such disregard can conceivably develop into a will to actively worsen 
the perceived environmental damage that the country is purporting to 
redress through treaty membership. Mitchell (in Cameron, Werkman and 
Roderick 1996: 22), drawing on Morgenthau, strikes at the heart of this 
dilemma though the simple observation that ‘nobody at all has the obli-
gation to enforce international law’. This in turn begs a further question, 
namely, why should a state bother to comply with the international envi-
ronmental treaties that it signs up to?  
Analysts have developed sophisticated theoretical frames in order to ad-
dress core aspects of this issue.  At the vanguard of these systems sits 
compliance theory. “Compliance” in this particular theoretical context 
is understood to mean ‘an actor’s behaviour that conforms to a treaty’s 
explicit rules’ (Mitchell in Cameron, Werkman and Roderick 1996: 5). 
Mitchell (1996: 3-28) has usefully overviewed three of the most prom-
inent schools of compliance theory traditionally employed to elucidate 
the issue of international environmental treaty compliance.  These can be 
summarised as the pragmatist, the realist, and the institutionalist models. 
The pragmatist system of compliance presupposes that the tangible suc-
cess or otherwise of international treaties is extremely hard to pinpoint 
in direct, measureable terms. The realists and institutionalists foreground 
wider factors – power relations, institutional structures – which they ar-
gue exert a stronger collective shaping role upon collective behaviour 
than the given treaty in its own right, thereby, as with the pragmatist 
model, disturbing the idea that a simple and reliable means of interrogat-
ing and measuring treaty compliance and its associated perceptible lev-
els of realised action can be readily employed. Space precludes detailed 
examination of these systems, however a useful lesson to be drawn for 
present purposes may be summarised as follows: the elements of this 
study’s title pertaining to the evaluation of compliant “action” / “execu-
tion” / “results” constitute deceptively complex ground. Ground that is 
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so deeply contested that it is perhaps not hyperbole to suggest that there 
is no widely accepted common standard amongst scholarly commenta-
tors as to how one might work toward a satisfactory evaluative resolu-
tion of treaty compliance in the context of these issues.
Self-Interest trumps Environmental Action?
When first considered this all appears to evoke a sort of “take it or leave 
it” treaty system that facilitates the prevalence of self-interest and there-
by represses a will to translate treaty arrangements into affirmative envi-
ronmentally useful action. ‘The simplest explanation of why a govern-
ment or other actor regulated by a treaty undertakes a given behaviour’, 
Mitchell (in Cameron, Werkman and Roderick 1996: 7) writes, ‘is be-
cause they believe it furthers their interest’. Yet Alder and Wilkinson 
(1999: 116) have convincingly emphasised how certain international 
environmental treaties appear to construe nature as a phenomenon pos-
sessed of an intrinsic value that ought to be actively safeguarded for its 
own sake.  For example, such environmental altruism is:
reflected in the 1950 International Convention for the Protec-
tion of Birds, which in contrast to its 1902 predecessor, was 
aimed at protecting all birds, not simply those useful to agri-
culture.
An internationally recognised sense of value inhering in the natural en-
vironment serves to temper the forces of undiluted national self-interest 
somewhat. This perspective lends apparent weight to the international 
community’s desire to translate international environmental treaties into 
environmentally valuable action and to progress towards a sustainable 
future (Meadowcroft 2000: 370).
Evidence of this momentum toward environmentally sound action was 
witnessed in the years prior to the environmental “boom” of the 1970s 
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through, for example, the Fur Seal Treaty. This agreement was set in 
place in 1911 in order to protect seals, whose numbers had declined dan-
gerously during intensive kills. The signatories to the treaty were Japan, 
Canada, America and the USSR. It stipulated that the killing of seals 
at sea would cease and control of their killing on the islands on which 
they bred would fall to America and Russia, with a proportionate levy of 
these kills being siphoned off by Japan and Canada to compensate them 
for the new arrangement. By the 1950s the seal population had returned 
successfully to pre-exploitation figures. Similar environmentally posi-
tive outcomes can be detected during the booming 1970s: for example, 
the 1972 Oslo Convention compelled subscribing nations to implement 
legislation prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste and thus helped 
such waste to be successfully eradicated from the North Sea. Post-1970s, 
the Montreal Ozone Protocol stands as a similarly strong example. This 
agreement allowed the international community to successfully reduce 
the use of ozone-depleting substances so that the ozone layer has since 
been able to begin the process of repairing itself. The active environmen-
tal results galvanised by the treaties drawn upon here are measureable, 
evident, and clearly successful.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that international environmental treaties al-
low nations to work together in order to affect a degree of active, tangible 
environmental change that is superior to a pattern characterised by the 
mere faulty application of international law leading to puny outcomes. 
This should not belie the fact, however, that the transition from “treaty 
instrument” to real-world “action” is difficult to achieve and may indeed 
fail. Thus, environmental treaties may be characterised on occasion by 
the “grand pretentions, faulty execution and puny results” that Bodansky 
speaks of, but this is by no means the general rule.
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